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There is an ongoing concern among managers and scholars: how can firms develop trust? Our 
paper aims to review the emerging perspective of trust and propose 6 mechanisms to build 
trust in channel relationships. We develop a model containing the following mechanisms: cal-
culative, affective, believe, embeddedness, continuity and capability. We conducted a survey 
to check whether the mechanisms influence firm performance. The data source comprise of a 
sample (n=132) in the Brazilian Distribution Market of agrochemical products. Results show 
the impact of the first three mechanisms on firm performance. The findings highlight that, 
even though environment leads to suspicion and doubts, managers seek trusty relationships 
and try to develop it using a combination of few mechanisms to overcome difficulties and per-
form well. 
 
1.  Introduction 
Trust in the relationship between manufacturer and supplying companies seems essen-
tial for their business success. Rapidly changing competitive environments are forcing man-
agers to seek more creative and flexible means for meeting competition. In literature, we see 
reports claiming that many firms have responded to these challenges by developing trust in 
collaborative relationships with their distribution channels. Trust operates as a governance 
mechanism that allows companies to share information and that mitigates opportunism in ex-
change contexts characterized by uncertainty and dependence. By using trust, firms can re-
duce the transaction costs associated with monitoring, contracting and punishing opportunistic 
behavior.  
The question that may be addressed in this context is: how can firms develop trust? In 
this line of thought, our paper aims to study trust dimensions, problems related to trust rela-
tionships and mechanism to build it up. We base our study on the emerging marketing and 
management literature on trust.  Following this aim, it intends to provide a comprehensive 
model to manage trust.  
A survey in the agrochemical industry has been conducted in order to collect and test a 
model to develop trust. Agrochemical products (e.g. fungicide and insecticide) are distributed 
to growers by companies that purchase it from chemical manufactures. The manufactures try 
to develop relationships with the distributor company to sell products and more importantly to 
assist growers in the use of the products. This is an interesting relationship to study trust be-
cause products have critical characteristics. Products are toxic and can easily harm human be-
ings and the environment. For growers to use products in a proper way, supplying companies 
have to be working closely together with manufacturers. This relationship with manufacturers 
allows distributing companies to offer growers the best assistance throughout the use of the 
product. In addition to the characteristic of the products, distributors are relatively smaller 
than manufacturers and depend on the manufacturers’ products.  
 
2. Emerging perspective on trust 
 
Trust refers to the extent to which negotiations are fair and commitments are sustained 
(Anderson and Narus, 1990). The need for trust between partners has been identified as an 
essential element of buyer-supplier relationships (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar, 1998; Rousseau, et al. 1998). Previous research showed that trust is a 
basic requirement in the context of buyer-supplier relationships (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). 
According to Ring and Van de Ven (1992), trust plays a key role in any organizational rela-
tionship. Trust enables partners to manage risk and opportunism in transactions (Nooteboom, 
Berger and Noorderhaven, 1997). There is an element of trust in every transaction, although it 
varies across the transacting partners (Arrow, 1973). Moreover, trust helps to reduce complex 
realities more quickly and economically than prediction, authority or bargaining (Powell, 
1990).  
Trust is a key concept in many research fields, as reflected, for example, in the mar-
keting channels literature (Anderson and Weitz, 1989; Anderson and Narus, 1990; Ganesan, 
1994; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Doney and Cannon, 1997), organizational decision making 
(Zand, 1972), network literature (Thorelli, 1986; Jarillo, 1988; Powell, 1990; Larson, 1992; 
Uzzi, 1997; Coleaman, 1988), transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1993; Zajac and Ol-
sen, 1993; Zylbersztajn and Zuurbier, 1999) and psychology (Rotter, 1971; Rotter, 1980). 
Each of these schools of thought uses a different definition of trust. Building on Geyskens, 
Steenkamp and Kumar’s (1998) compilation of definitions of trust, we developed our own 
compilation that includes the network and other research traditions (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Representative literature on trust 
Study  Research 
Tradition 
Unit of Analy-
sis  Conceptualization of Trust 
Anderson and 




ative and their 
suppliers 
A firm’s belief that its needs will be fulfilled in the future by 
actions undertaken by their partner. 
 
Anderson and 






A firm’s belief that partners will perform actions that will 
result in positive outcomes for the firm and will not take un-
expected actions that would result in negative outcomes for 
the firm.   
Barney and 
Hansen (1994) 
Management  Organizations  The mutual confidence that no party to an exchange will ex-
ploit another’s vulnerabilities. 
Bradach and 
Eccles (1989) 
Management  Organizations  The positive expectation that reduces the risk that the ex-








retail buyers  
The belief that the partner is credible and benevolent. 
Granovetter 
(1985) 
Networks  Organizations  Confidence in the general morality of individuals.  





The particular level of subjective probability with which 
agents assess whether another agent or group will perform a 
particular action both before they can monitor such action 





Networks  Organizations  A context in which the probability that a partner will perform 
an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to the 
counterpart is sufficiently high as to consider engaging in 






Car dealers and 
car manufactur-
er  
The belief that the partner is honest and benevolent. 
Morgan and 






Confidence in the partner’s reliability and integrity. 
Powell (1990)  Networks Organizations    Confidence  translated into the act of taking as certain those 
critical aspects of life which in a business environment are 
rendered uncertain.     
 
 
Table 1: Continued 
    
Rotter (1971, 
1980) 
Psychology  Individuals   A generalized expectancy held by an individual that the 






in the medical 
industry 
The belief, attitude or expectation that the actions or out-
comes of another individual or organization will be accepta-




rillo (1988)  
Networks  Organizations  An assumption or reliance on the part of A that if either A or 
B encounters a problem in the fulfillment of implicit or ex-
plicit transactional obligations, B may be counted on to do 
what A would do if B’s resources were at A’s disposal. 
Uzzi (1997)  Networks Apparel  stores 
and their suppli-
ers 
The belief that an exchange partner would not act in self-
interest at another’s expense and operates not like calculated 
risk but like a heuristic – a predilection to assume the best 






Organizations  The rational form of trust fostered by mutual hostages, and 











The leap of faith by placing confidence in a referent without 
knowing with absolute certainty that the referent’s future 











The extent to which negotiations are fair and commitments 
are upheld. Trust is a multidimensional concept, significant-
ly developed on affective behavioral and cognitive bases.  
Zand (1972)  Management Individual  man-
agers 
Actions that (a) increase one’s vulnerability, (b) to another 
whose behavior is not under one’s control (c) in a situation 
in which the penalty (disutility) one suffers if the other 
abuses that vulnerability is greater than the benefit (utility) 
one gains if the other does not abuse that vulnerability. 
Based on Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar (1998: 226)       
 
Before discussing a central hypothesis of this study, we discuss the features and di-
mensions, problems, and mechanisms to develop trust. 
 
Dimensions of trust   
As Table 1 shows, significant differences in assumptions and methods exist between 
behaviorally oriented and economically oriented organizational scholars (Barney, 1991). On 
the one hand, behaviorally oriented researchers argue that most exchange partners are trust-
worthy, that they behave as stewards over the resources under their control and thus that trust 
in an exchange relationship – even without legal and contractual safeguards – will become 
common (Das and Teng, 1998). On the other hand, economically oriented scholars respond 
that it is difficult to distinguish at first between exchange partners that are actually trustworthy 
and those that only claim to be trustworthy (Williamson, 1993). This limits the scope of trust 
to that within rational prediction or calculation, wherein partners focus on collecting and 
processing information to forecast likely outcomes of certain future events (Doney and Ca-
non, 1997). Although rational prediction is clearly an important part of trust, it provides a 
grossly incomplete understanding of trust on its own. Moreover, some economists recognize 
that a degree of trust must be assumed to operate, since formal control mechanisms alone cannot entirely stem force or fraud (Akerlof, 1970; Klein, 1996). Following this extensive 
discussion, six mechanisms to build trust can be identified in the literature.  
First, the economic literature suggests that trust primarily involves a calculative 
process (Williamson, 1996). To the extent that the benefits of cheating do not exceed the costs 
of being caught, the buyer infers that it would be contrary to the supplier’s best interest to 
cheat, and so the supplier can be trusted (Akerlof, 1970). Therefore, managers have to be able 
to calculate the costs and rewards of another party cheating or cooperating in a relationship.  
Following Wicks, Berman and Jones (1999), we identify two behavioral characteris-
tics that add up to calculative-based trust, namely affection and belief. Affection is an emotion 
felt by people in a relationship (Rotter, 1980). Trust occurs because an emotional bond is 
created between individuals, enabling them to move beyond rational prediction to take a leap 
of faith that trust will be honored (Wicks, Berman and Jones, 1999). Some authors in the mar-
keting channels school view affection-based trust as the benevolence of an individual toward 
a relationship (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Benevolence in a partner 
is motivated by concern for the well-being of the relationship itself and not by the goal of im-
proving own welfare at the expense of the partners’ interests (Ganesan, 1994). The affective 
aspect of trust has a clear moral element and is influenced by the intentions of the other party 
(Deutsh, 1969). Therefore, managers can interpret the other party’s words and actions, and 
attempt to determine their intentions in the relationship. 
The emotional bond in question is not just in the relationship but is, in large part, a be-
lief in the moral character or goodwill of the trustee in the trusting relationship. Through their 
shared beliefs, partners can create goal congruence and so reduce the risk of free-riding and 
other types of opportunism (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). In the marketing channels tradition, 
belief-based trust is described as credibility (Kumar, Sheer and Steenkamp, 1995). As trust 
stems from expectations of how another party will behave based on that party’s past and 
present implicit and explicit claims, a manager needs to forecast another party’s behavior. 
We highlight the affective and belief features because both are critical to build trust. 
Rational prediction (calculation) helps prevent partners from trusting blindly or foolishly. Af-
fection and belief are necessary for developing and sustaining mutually trusting relationships, 
as well as for realizing the benefits that flow from trust. Thus, the level of trust can range 
from a degree of affection-based belief in moral character (e.g., having less than a fully effec-
tive deterrent, such as mutually assured destruction), extending up to the point at which trust 
is so complete as to constitute ‘blind faith’ in the moral character of the other (e.g., that be-
tween parent and child). Based on this understanding, a widely accepted definition of trust 
refers to the belief, attitude or expectation that the actions or outcomes of another individual, 
group or organization will be acceptable or will serve the partner’s interest (Sitkin and Roth, 
1993).  
Although this definition embraces the calculative, affective-based and belief aspects of 
trust discussed previously, for business relationships three other features need specific elabo-
ration. First, trust is directly influenced by the network because trust is socially embedded 
(Granovetter, 1985). Trust exists within a context and is shaped by the dynamics specific to a 
particular social setting (Powell, 1990). Trust can be transferred from a trusted proof source to 
another individual or group with which the buyer has little or no direct experience (Doney and 
Canon, 1997). This transference process allows spreading trust from a known entity to an un-
known entity. In his discussion of embeddedness, Granovetter (1985) demonstrated that the 
models used in classical and neoclassical economics (such as transaction cost economics) are 
under socialized and omit the role of concrete personal relations and structures (or networks, 
as discussed previously). He emphasized the fundamental conceptual inadequacy of under 
socialized approaches to trust (i.e., theories not taking embeddedness seriously), particularly 
for both describing and creating trusting relations.  Second, trust is continuous, as opposed to being a static and discrete concept (Das and 
Teng, 1998; Wicks, Berman and Jones, 1999). A partner can both trust and distrust people at 
the same time (Sitkin and Roth, 1993). The development of trust relies on the formation of 
one partner’s expectations about the motives and behaviors of another. Further, trust has a 
wide spectrum, and it can vary substantially both, within and across relationships, as well as 
over time. As Bradach and Eccles (1989: 108) said, “in dynamic and continuous settings, a 
record of prior exchange, often obtained secondhand or by imputation from outcomes of prior 
exchange, provides data on the exchange process. Relationships unfold so that individuals 
continually update their information base and their decisions to trust.”       
Finally, trust can be built on the basis of the partners capabilities. A manager can as-
sess the ability to meet his or her obligations as well as the partner’s expectations. Trust as a 
derivative of technically competent performance ensures partners that desired outcomes can 
be obtained. The focus can be turned to the credibility component of trust.  
 
Managing Trust and performance 
Firms involved in trust relationships are likely to perform well. Trust relationships al-
low firms to have a shared belief that in the long run, rewards will be distributed fairly among 
the partners (Barney and Hansen, 1994). There is a general sense that this year’s winner could 
be next year’s loser and, consequently, to press one’s advantage opportunistically would be 
unadvisable. Trust is an important lubricant of relationships. It binds parties and has an impor-
tant future orientation (Ganesan, 1994). Previous studies found that trust guides behavior in 
some business settings (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Doney and Cannon, 1997), and when trust is 
operative the risk of opportunism and market instability is reduced. Moreover, Smith and Bar-
clay (1997) found that trust significantly affects the attitudes and behavior of suppliers toward 
buyers (i.e., independent sellers).  
A high degree of trust between the partners in a business relationship is conducive to 
coordinative behavior. This assertion follows the findings of Anderson and Narus (1990) and 
Gulati (1995). Trust encourages effective communication, information sharing and joint pay-
offs (Dwyer, Schur and Oh, 1987, Ring and Van de Ven, 1992) and might create a strong so-
cial bond (Barney and Hansen, 1994). Thus, trust significantly reduces the perception of risk 
associated with opportunistic behavior by a partner; it increases confidence that short-term 
inequities will be resolved over the long term and reduces the transaction costs in an exchange 
relationship (Ganesan, 1994). Therefore, we expect that the higher the degree of the six me-
chanisms to build trust, the higher the performance of the company. An implicit assumption 
of our hypothesis is that the higher the mechanisms to build trust in place, the higher the level 
of trust will be.  
In this study, we included three control variables. Previous research suggests that the 
buyer-supplier relationship might be affected by the dependency (Lush and Brown, 1996), 
and firm size (Lush and Brown, 1996). We do not specify hypotheses to each of the control 
variables, overall we expect a positive relation between firm size, and performance. In addi-
tion, we expect a negative relationship between dependency and performance. The model is 







Figure 1: The model of trust and performance  
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Data collection.  
The data were collected in the year 2005 in Brazil. Every year, one of the largest agro-
chemical producers promotes an event to gather all of its distributors. With the agreement of 
this producer, we made a general presentation about the research project and invited distribu-
tors to fill in the questionnaires. There were over 300 distributors on site coming from all dif-
ferent regions of Brazil. After excluding non-qualifying distributors (e.g., foreign companies), 
the data collection effort yielded 158 responses of distributor companies, of which 26 were 
incomplete questionnaires. Our data collection effort resulted in 132 usable questionnaires 
with a 67% response rate.  
A self-administered questionnaire was used that consists of 42 pre-coded questions. 
For most of the items Likert 5-point response format were used, and a limited number of 
items were assessed with 2 to 5-point response formats. When responding to the questions 
about the mechanisms of trust and performance, informants were asked to consider their rela-
tionship with the most important agrochemical producer.  
Before starting the data collection, we tested the questionnaire in a panel. The input 
from a panel composed of faculty members and industry experts. It was also particularly help-
ful in order to create the different measurement scales and individual items. The panel helped 
improving the wording of some questions and also provided information to develop a list of 
concepts and definitions, which was included in the introduction letter of the questionnaire.  
 
Research instrument  
Trust in operational terms refers to the belief that the other partner is honest and sin-
cere and in no circumstances will deliberately do anything that will damage the relationship. 
Trust is also embodied in a partner’s belief that its requirements will be fulfilled through fu-
ture actions undertaken by the counterpart (Anderson and Weitz, 1989; Barney and Hansen, 
1994). We operationalized trust in six mechanisms to build it up. The measure to the calcula-
tive dimension refers to the activities to calculating costs and rewards (Crombach α=.735). 
We used 3 items such as: “sales in relation to the store space allocated for partners’ products” 
and “Consumer flow given partners’ products in the store”. The measure to capture the be-
lieve dimension refers to the activities to forecast counterpart’s behavior (α= .762). We used 2 
items such as: “The environment to work with this supplier is pretty good” and “We get time-
ly and accurate information from this supplier”. The measure to capture the affective dimen-
sion refers to the activities to forecast counterpart’s intentions (α= .680). We used 2 items 
such as: “He/she perfectly understands my needs”. The measure to capture the capability of 
the partner refers basically to the assessment of the counterpart’s ability to meet obligations 
(α= .594). There were 5 items such as: “It is good the number of salespeople and technical 
personnel of the partner assisting us in the business” and “The sales representative of the part-
ner is knowledgeable about the products and is trained to assist us”. All of the four measures described above were 5-point Likert scale raging from “Totally disagree” to “Totally agree”. 
The score of each measure was the unweighted average of the corresponding items. We used 
a 10-point Likert scale to measure the importance of the network to the development of the 
business relationship. We tried to capture 4 relevant themes to the companies in the industry. 
They were related to competition among distributors of the same agrochemical supplier, com-
petition with other distribution channels, conflict with direct distribution and price setting dif-
ferences. We decided to keep in the estimation, though this measurement instrument did not 
perform so well (α= .574). Finally, the measure to capture the continuity dimension of the me-
chanisms to build up trust refers to an open-ended question as to the number of years that the 
respondent had done business with the selected agrochemical producer.  
This study applies a multidimensional measure of performance with a 5-point Likert 
scale ranging from “not at all satisfied” to “totally satisfied”. We measured the satisfaction of 
the distributor with the contact person in the selected agrochemical producer. Four items were 
used to this measure. We also measured satisfaction of the distributor with the profitability 
and margin of the sales of the products of the selected producer. Two items were used to cap-
ture the distributors’ perception about the financial results. The score of the performance vari-
able was the unweighted average of the corresponding items. 
  Three control variables were used in the estimation. To measure dependency, we 
used an open-ended question as to the percentage of the products comes from the selected 
producer. We used two measures for firm size. They were the annual turnover of the company 
and the size of the sales force. 
 We checked the reliability of our measurement instruments using Cronbach's alpha, 
composite reliability (> .67), and extracted variance (> .61) of the measures. In all cases Cron-
bach's alpha was sufficiently high ( > .70) to warrant confidence in the internal consistency of 
the scales, except two measure of the trust mechanism that is about 0.60. The correlations be-
tween the constructs did not suggest problems of pair wise colinearity that would preclude the 
use of all constructs in one equation (Hair et al. 1998). Table 2 displays the correlation matrix 
and descriptive statistics.  
Table 2: Correlation and Descriptive 
  Mean SD  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Performance (1)  4.01  0.57  1          
Calculative (2)  3.76 0.60  .44  1         
Affective (3)  3.81 0.74  .55  .39  1        
Belief (4)  4.22 0.79  .58 .40 .33  1        
Capability (5)  4.32 0.46  .47  .41 .34 .55  1        
Embeddedness (6)  5.28 2.52  -.03  .12  -.10  -.07  -.02  1       
Continuity (7)  7.39  5.60  -.08 -.16 -.10 -.10 .00 .07  1     
Sales force (8)  9.47  8.64 -.14 .03 .00 .00 .00 .15 .11  1   
Dependency (9)  48.13 27.80 .01 .07 -.03 .06 .11 .02  -.19  -.32 1 
Turnover (10)  2.78E7  4.37E7  -.07 -.02 -.06 .06 .05 .19 .19 .32  -.02 
 
4. Results  
 
The hypotheses were tested based on Ordinary Least Square Regression. Regression 
analysis is popular among researchers because it allows for an evaluation of the degree (i.e. 
coefficient size), nature (i.e. coefficient sign) and optimization (i.e. coefficient of determina-
tion, R
2) of association between variables (Hair et al. 1998). By computing the unweighted 
average of the items reflecting each construct, we regressed the six mechanisms to build trust 
and the control variables on performance (Table 3). Tests for multicollinearity showed no 
problem. The indices lie below the threshold values of 10 for the VIF test and 30 for the Con-dition index (Hair et al. 1998). The explanatory power of the equation supports the further ex-
amination of individual coefficients, to check the effects of each mechanism on performance. 
 
Table 3: Results of the model estimation 
 Performance  Supported? 
Calculative .280  (3.19)  *** Yes 
Affective  .364 (4.39)*** Yes 
Belief  .294 (3.34)*** Yes 
Capability   .062 (.73)  Not significant 
Embeddedness  .048 (.72)  Not significant 
Continuity  .017 (.25)  Not significant 
Size of Sales Force  -.210 (2.79)*** No 
Dependency  -.081 (1.09)  Not significant 
Turnover  -.025 (.35)  Not significant 
Adjusted R
2  .628***  
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Notes: Regression coeffi-
cients are standardized coefficients (β) and |t-test| within pa-
rentheses. 
 
There are several positive significant effects of the mechanisms of trust on perfor-
mance. The results show that calculative mechanism influences positively performance 
(β=.28, p<.001), which is in line with our hypothesis. This suggests that distributors created 
an estimation process that the costs of a supplier acting in an untrustworthy manner are quite 
high for firms with good reputation. Companies that consistently deliver on its promises to 
others or it would not have been able to maintain its position in the market. By assessing care-
fully the gains and losses of developing a trust relationship, the distributor does not expect 
any opportunistic behavior of its counterpart. 
The affective mechanism to build trust also influences positively performance (β=.36, 
p<.001). The distributor that is able to interpret the counterpart’s intentions performs well. 
The distributors need to develop an accurate assessment of buyers’ interests and values. The 
counterparts that hold common goals and policies are able to sign similar intentions. The mor-
al element plays an important role in the relationship and may allow distributors to better 
forecast long-term actions of a counterpart.   
The belief mechanism to build trust have a positive significant effect on performance 
(β=.29, p<.001). Distributors that believe their suppliers cannot be trusted and are more likely 
to behave in an untrustworthy manner, by being reluctant to share information. The extent to 
which a supplier shares confidential information with its distributor also provides a signal of 
good faith. The positive climate in a relationship allows a distributor to perceive reciprocity 
and mutuality. Through the belief mechanism, distributors may increase the engagement of 
the counterpart in the relationship and consequently increase trust.    
There is no significant impact of the other mechanisms to build trust on the perfor-
mance measure. The mechanisms of capability, embeddedness and continuity presented a not 
significant coefficient.  
The control variables of dependency and annual turnover do not have a significant ef-
fect on performance. The size of the sales force presented a significant negative coefficient 
(β=-.21, p<.001), opposed to previous research about firm size and performance. Most re-
searchers agree that larger firms have become so by virtue of achievement, which suggests a 
general intention to invest and take some risks. Interestingly, the distributors appear to lose 
performance as the number of the sales force increases. One possible explanation is the fact 
that the industry has gone through a wealthy period in areas were distributors’ clients are large producers of soybean. The agribusiness in Brazil faced a great increase in financial results be-
cause of international price of such a bean.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This study aimed to discuss the emerging perspective on trust and develop a model of 
mechanisms to build trust. We tested the impact of the mechanisms on performance. The find-
ings of our estimated model shows that, even though environment leads to suspicion and 
doubts, managers in the distribution companies seek trust relationships and try to develop 
trust using a combination of mechanisms to overcome potential problems (i.e. opportunistic 
behavior) in trust relationships. Thus, the results of the survey provided important evidence to 
support the theoretical discussions at hand. Overall, the trust showed to be a governance me-
chanism that efficiently coordinates the activities in the relationship.  
The findings of this paper provide important evidence for the theoretical discussion of 
trust in business relationships. Our framework of six mechanisms to build trust gives insights 
on how trust is built. Although our survey does not test the existence of trust, it provides in-
sight into how trust is generated. This study also attempts to measure in the same context six 
apparently mechanisms to build up trust. The theoretical development and results suggest that 
the mechanisms by which trust is built are not only based on the calculative dimension. The 
affective and belief mechanisms appear to play an important role in trust building effort.    
Managers may use our study and its empirical evidence as a check on the adequacy of 
their existing relationships and the type of mechanism they use to develop trust. Firms should 
weigh the entire set of important relationships to invest more in the mechanisms that lead to 
performance. Calculating costs and rewards appear to be relevant to develop trust, though not 
exclusively. Forecasting counterpart’s behavior and intentions appear to support the belief and 
affect mechanisms that support the development of trust. The mere effort of calculating and 
creating the necessary emotional bonds may lead to an improvement of decision making by 
managers. It is also important for managers to have accurate perceptions of the impact of trust 
on performance. We do not claim for managers to develop all relationships based on trust, 
though the most important may be coordinated by means of trust. The trust is costly to devel-
op and maintain. By considering each of the mechanisms, companies can better do business. 
If managers either under- or overestimate the positive impact of trust, their efforts will be 
misguided, eventually dampening performance.  
Some limitations must be considered. We used a cross-sectional design, thus prevent-
ing the investigation of the dynamic effects of the performance on trust mechanisms. Further 
work can consider a longitudinal study to investigate the framework at different points in 
time. There is also a need to check the causality of the estimated relationships in the model. 
There might be a possibility that mechanisms influence each other fostering even more per-
formance. Future research may address these impacts. Our study domain was distributors in 
the Brazilian agrochemical sector. This might limit the generalization of our conclusions. Fur-
ther research is encouraged to replicate the research in a different setting, such as another 
country or product. We concentrated our analysis on some elements of performance. Future 
research can investigate other objective measures of performance. 
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